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SECURITIES REGULATION-SECURITIES EXCHANGE
ACT-COOPERATIvE-Uncollateralized, unsecured demand notes
sold as an investment vehicle fall within both the "note" and "se-
curity" categories of section 3(a)(10)of the Securities Exchange
Act.
Reves v Ernst & Young,-US-, 110 S Ct 945, 948 (1990).
The Farmers Cooperative of Arkansas and Oklahoma, Inc. (here-
inafter, "Co-op") obtained a portion of its general business operat-
ing funds from the sale of uncollateralized, uninsured demand
promissory notes.' The notes were sold on an ongoing basis to both
Co-op members and nonmembers.2 Marketed as an investment de-
vice, the notes paid a variable rate of interest higher than that
which was paid by local financial institutions.3 No financial infor-
mation regarding the Co-op was released to the purchasers except
a statement of the Co-op's total assets, which was released
periodically.4
Arthur Young5 was engaged by the Co-op to audit and report on
the Co-op's 1981 and 1982 financial statements.6 The audited fi-
nancial statements were not publicly released. The management
of the Co-op drafted condensed financial statements which were
distributed at the Co-op's annual shareholder meeting. 8 Represent-
atives of Arthur Young spoke to the Co-op members at both the
1981 and 1982 annual meetings and described the general financial
status of the Co-op.9 The members were informed that copies of
the full audited financial statements and the reports which were
prepared by Arthur Young were available at the Co-op's office.10
The Co-op became insolvent and subsequently filed for bank-
1. Reves v Ernst & Young,-US-, 110 S Ct 945 (1990). A demand promissory
note is a written promise committing the issuer to pay the specified sum of money-on de-
mand, with or without interest. Demand notes are negotiable. Dictionary of Finance And
Investment Terms 311 (Barron's, 2d ed 1987).
2. Reves v Ernst & Young, 856 F2d 52, 53 (2d Cir 1988).
3. Reves, 110 S Ct at 948.
4. Reves, 856 F2d at 53.
5, Arthur Young was the predecessor to Ernst & Young.
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ruptcy in 1984.11 Holders of the demand notes (hereinafter,
"Class") brought suit against Arthur Young, alleging violation of
the anti-fraud provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.12
The noteholders alleged that Arthur Young had failed to follow
generally accepted accounting procedures which would have re-
vealed the Co-op's insolvency to prospective note purchasers. 3 The
district court entered judgment on a jury verdict, holding that Ar-
thur Young had violated section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act and section 67-1256 of the Arkansas Securities Act in connec-
tion with the sale of the demand notes. 4 Arthur Young appealed
the district court's decision. 5
The Class cross-appealed, claiming that the district court erred
in crediting settlement proceeds against the jury verdict -and in
granting summary judgment in favor of Arthur Young on the
Class' claim under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organi-
zations Act ("RICO").
16
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit re-
versed the denial of Arthur Young's motion for judgment n.o.v.
and entered judgment for Arthur Young. The Class' and Trustee's
claims were dismissed.'
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit ex-
amined the status of the notes according to a test developed by the
11. Reves, 110 S Ct at 948.
12. Id. The Securities Exchange Act is codified as amended in 15 USC §§ 78a-78jj
(1982 & Supp 1987). The Securities Exchange Act regulates specified investment instru-
ments including "any note[s]." 15 USC § 78c(a)(10) (1987).
13. Reves, 110 S Ct at 948.
14. Reves, 856 F2d at 53. Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any na-
tional securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale, of any security regis-
tered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipu-
lative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regula-
tions as the Commission may proscribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors.
15 USC § 10(b), 48 Stat 891, codified as amended in 15 USC section 78j(b). The Arkansas
Securities Act was not discussed by the Supreme Court. Reves, 110 S Ct at 954.
15. Id. Arthur Young appealed on five grounds: 1) the denial of Arthur Young's mo-
tion for new trial or judgment n.o.v.; 2) the award of costs to the Trustee and Class; 3) the
award of attorney's fees to class counsel; 4) the calculation of pretrial and post-trial post
judgment interest; and, 5) the denial of its petition for costs against the Trustee and Class.
Reves, 856 F2d at 53.
16. Id. The provisions of RICO can be found at 18 USC §§ 1961-1968.
17. Reves, 856 F2d at 53.
1991 Recent Decisions
United States Supreme Court in SEC v Howey Co. 8 to determine
whether the notes were a "security" under the Securities Exchange
Act, and therefore, subject to the provisions of the Act. 9 The Se-
curities Exchange Act defines a security in broad terms intended to
encompass any speculative investment scheme; therefore, courts
have compared the characteristics of a disputed scheme to the in-
dicia of established securities. The Eighth Circuit examined the
notes and determined that this transaction was akin to a commer-
cial transaction, not an investment contract.2 The court found no
reasonable expectation of profit in Reves.2 ' The notes were also
found to be uncharacteristic of securities.22 Due to the foregoing
analysis, the court determined that the notes were not securities
within the ambit of the Securities Exchange Act. Judgment was
entered for Arthur Young. 3
The noteholders appealed the decision of the United States Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.2" The Supreme Court
addressed the issue of whether the demand notes issued by the Co-
op were "securit[ies]" within the meaning of section 3(a)(10) of the
Securities Exchange Act.25 The Supreme Court reversed the deci-
sion of the Eighth Circuit, holding that the notes constitute "secu-
rit[ies]" under the Act and that the demand nature of the notes
does not remove them from the scope of the Securities Exchange
Act.26
Beginning the analysis with the definition of a "security" under
section 3(a)(10), the Court laid out the letter of the law.27 The
18. 328 US 293 (1974).
19. Reves, 856 F2d at 54. See note 27 for the definition of a security under the Secur-
ities Exchange Act.
20. Reves, 856 F2d at 54. An investment contract is a "contract, transaction or
scheme whereby a person invests his money in a common enterprise and is led to expect
profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party." Howey, 328 US at 293
(internal quotations omitted).
21. Reves, 856 F2d at 54.
22. Id at 55.
23. Id.
24. Reves, 110 S Ct at 948.
25. Id. 15 USC § 77c(a)(10).
26. Reves, 110 S Ct at 948.
27. Id. Section 3(a)(10) of the Securities Exchange Act provides:
[U]nless the context otherwise requires-the term "security" means any note, stock,
treasury stock, bond, debenture, certificate of interest or participation in any profit
sharing agreement or in any oil, gas, or other mineral royalty or lease, any collateral-
trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferrable share, in-
vestment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit, for a security, any
put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on any security, certificate of deposit, or group
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Court then expounded upon the purpose of the Securities Ex-
change Act.2 Due to serious abuses which had occurred in the un-
regulated securities market,2 9 the 1933-1934 Congress enacted pro-
phylactic legislation to curb future abuses.3 0 Additionally, because
of the severity and incidence of indiscretions which occurred in the
period preceding the stock market crash of 1929, the definition of a
"security" was broadly drafted to encompass the many types of
instruments which would fall within the common perception of a
"security."'" According to the Court, the definition of a security
encompassed virtually any instrument which might be sold as an
or index of securities (including any interest therein or based on the value thereof), or
any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege entered into on a national securities ex-
change relating to foreign currency, or in general, any instrument commonly known
as a "security"; or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim
certificate for, receipt for, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the
foregoing; but shall not include currency or any note, draft, bill of exchange, or
banker's acceptance which has a maturity at the time of issuance of not exceeding
nine months, exclusive of days of grace, or any renewal thereof the maturity of which
is likewise limited.
15 USC § 78c(a)(10) (1987).
28. Reves, 110 S Ct at 949. See note 30 and accompanying text.
29. Law & Business, Inc., Securities Activities of Banks 23, 29-30 (Harcourt Brace
Jovanovich 1984). Congressional inquiry revealed various abuses in the investment banking
field. Among the abuses which were revealed were: (1) Banks had extended imprudent loans
to securities affiliates; (2) Banks had extended imprudent loans to bank customers to facili-
tate the purchase of securities underwritten or distributed by the bank's securities affiliate;
(3) Assets of the parent institution were used to purchase "excessive securities holdings" of
the bank's securities affiliate; (4) Manipulative transactions were conducted with the stock
of the parent institution by the securities affiliate; (5) Bank officers directly profited from
the securities affiliates operations; (6) Securities were sold by affiliates to the parent banks
and other affiliates under repurchase agreements as a means of obtaining credit; (7) Banks
were purchasing securities from their affiliates in order to assure the success of their under-
writing endeavors; and (8) Banks were at risk of diminished depositor confidence as a result
of losses in the securities market. Id.
30. Reves, 110 S Ct at 949. The 1933-1934 Congress enacted three acts to regulate the
investment banking/securities field. The Glass-Steagall Act, the popular name given to vari-
ous provisions of the Banking Act of 1933, was intended to effectuate a complete separation
of the activities of commercial bankers and investment bankers in order to fortify the com-
mercial banking system. See Edmond lanni, "Security" Under the Glass-Steagall Act and
the Federal Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934: The Direction of the Supreme Court's Analy-
sis, 100 Bank L J 100, 103 (1983). The Glass-Steagall Act is codified as amended in sundry
sections of 12 USC. The Securities Act of 1933 was enacted to provide full and fair disclos-
ure of the character of securities sold in interstate and foreign commerce and through the
mails, and to prevent frauds in the sale thereof. The Securities Act of 1933 is codified as
amended in 15 USC sections 77a-77aa (1982 & Supp 1987). The Securities Exchange Act of
1934 was enacted to provide for the regulation of securities exchanges and over.the-counter
markets operating in interstate and foreign commerce and through the mails, to prevent
inequitable and unfair practices on such exchanges and markets. The Securities Exchange
Act is codified as amended in 15 USC sections 78a-78jj (1982 & Supp 1987).




The Court, however, recognized that notes33 fall outside the class
of investments which are "obviously within" the class of instru-
ments which Congress intended to regulate and which are "by
[their] nature[,] investments. 3 4 Demand notes, the Court con-
cluded, require a case-by-case analysis to determine the applicabil-
ity of the Securities Exchange Act.3 5 Because the Securities Ex-
change Act was enacted to regulate investment instruments, "any
note," as used in section 3(a)(10), must be considered in light of
the spirit of the Act.
30
The Supreme Court evaluated several tests to determine
whether an instrument is a "security, 37 and adopted the "family
resemblance" test." The "family resemblance" test was employed
because it was considered to have a more substantial framework
for analysis than the "investment v. commercial" test.3 9 Because
section 3(a)(10) includes "any note" within the ambit of the Act,
32. Id.
33. A note is an evidence of indebtedness obligating the signor to pay a sum certain
at a specified date. Dictionary of Finance and Investment Terms 262 (Barron's, 2d ed
1987). Notes are used in both the commercial and investment spheres.
34. Reves, 110 S Ct at 949. Landreth Timber, Co v Landreth, 471 US 681 (1985).
Common stock is the paradigm of a security, which is by nature an investment, and should
be treated as within the ambit of the securities laws, in whatever context common stock is
sold. Reves, 110 S Ct at 949.
35. Id.
36. Id at 950.
37. Id at 950-51. The Howey test defines a security as an investment in a common
enterprise with a reasonable expectation of profits to be derived from the entrepreneurial or
managerial efforts of others. Securities Exchange Comm v Howey Co, 328 US 293, 299
(1946). The "risk capital test" combines the Supreme Court's focus on the "economic reali-
ties" of the transaction with its emphasis that a security involves the expectation of profits
through an enterprise controlled by others. The ultimate question under the "risk capital"
test is whether risk capital was contributed which is subject to the entrepreneurial or mana-
gerial efforts of others. Underhill v Royal, 769 F2d 1426, 1431 (9th Cir 1985). The "family
resemblance test" compares the instrument in dispute to a list of instruments commonly
known as notes which the Second Circuit has determined are not securities. The note in
question is compared to determine whether it bears a "family resemblance" to the promul-
gated list of non-securities. Exchange National Bank of Chicago v Touche Ross & Co, 544
F2d 1126, 1138 (2d Cir 1976). The "investment v. commercial" test focuses on the degree of
dependance of the contributing party on the expertise and managerial efforts of others. The
applicability of the securities laws is dependant upon whether the transaction "more closely
resembles" a typical investment situation or a typical commercial transaction. If the trans-
action closely resembles an investment transaction and there is a high degree of dependance
upon the efforts of others, the securities laws are held to apply. Futura Development Corp v
Centex Corp, 761 F2d 33 (1st Cir 1985).
38. Reves, 110 S Ct at 951.
39. Id. See note 37 for definition of the "investment v commercial" test.
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notes are rebuttably presumed to be securities.40 The spirit of the
Act was to regulate the investment market and, therefore if an in-
strument is an investment it is within to the Securities Acts.41 A
list of instruments commonly known as notes, but which are
outside the connotation of a "security," was promulgated by the
Second Circuit.4 2 The list which was set forth by the Second Cir-
cuit was examined by the Supreme Court in Reeves to reveal the
characteristic components of the family members in order to estab-
lish a solid framework for analysis.4 3 The Supreme Court analyzed
the instruments according to four criteria to determine whether
the notes in question constituted a "security": 1) the motivation
behind the transaction; 2) the plan of distribution; 3) the common
perceptions of securities; and, 4) whether mitigating factors ren-
dered the application of the securities laws unnecessary.44
The Court stated that a note is'presumed to be a "security."' 5
However, that presumption may be rebutted by a determination
that the note in question bears a strong family resemblance to the
list espoused by the Second Circuit, in terms of the identified cri-
teria." The Court concluded that the demand notes sold by the
Co-op did not closely resemble the promulgated non-security
"family resemblance" list members. The Court went on to analyze
the demand notes in terms of the four criteria which it extrapo-
lated from the nature of the promulgated list. 7
The criterion of motivation was first examined by the Court.'8
The transaction was assessed to discern the motivations which
would prompt a reasonable buyer and seller to enter into it.49 In
Reeves, the Co-op sold the notes in order to raise capital for its
general business practices. 50 Because the notes offered a rate of re-
turn above that paid by local financial institutions, the Court in-
ferred that the transaction was naturally susceptible to public per-'
ception that it constituted an investment in a business enterprise.5
40. Reves, 110 S Ct at 951.
41. Id.
42. Id at 950. See Exchange National Bank of Chicago v Touche Ross & Co, 544 F2d
1126, 1138 (2d Cir 1976).
43. Reves, 110 S Ct at 951-52.
44. Id.
45. Id at 952.
46. Id. See note 186 and accompanying text.
47. Id at 952-53.
48. Reves, 110 S Ct at 952.
49. Id.
50. Id at 952.
51. Id at 952-53.
Vol. 29:853
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The purchasers bought the notes in order to earn an interest rate
above the financial market rates.2 In light of this motivation, the
Court concluded that the demand notes were an investment, rather
than a commercial, transaction.5
The second criterion which the Court addressed was the plan of
distribution." The plan of distribution of the instrument was ex-
amined to determine whether it was the type of instrument in
which there commonly exists trading for speculative purposes. The
notes at issue were offered to both Co-op members and nonmem-
bers over an extended period of time and at the time that the Co-
op filed for bankruptcy, more than 1,600 people held notes." In-
struments which are in "common trading" are investment instru-
ments. 6 The Court determined that to establish "common trad-
ing" of an instrument, an offering to a broad segment of the
population must be shown. 7 The length of the period of offering
and the breadth of the offering class were opined to be sufficient to
establish "common trading" in this case. 8
The third criterion considered by the Court was the common
perceptions Of securities.5 9 The reasonable expectations of the in-
vesting public were examined to determine whether the instrument
was commonly perceived to be a "security." Instruments will be
considered to be securities on the basis of public expectation, even
where economic analysis of the circumstances of the transaction
would suggest that the instruments are not securities.6 The Court
found the rudimentary essence of a "security" to be its characteris-
tic as an investment. 1 In the instant case, the Co-op advertised
the demand notes as an investment program.62 The note's rate of
return was above the market rate of return available through fi-
nancial institutions. 3 No countervailing factors were found by the
Court to temper the characterization of the notes as an investment
and, therefore, the Court found it reasonable for a member of the














public to perceive the demand notes as a security."' The final crite-
rion examined by the Court was the existence of factors which
would serve to mitigate risk. 5 The Court addressed the existence,
or lack thereof, of other factors which would serve to reduce the
risk of the transaction, thus rendering unnecessary application of
the Securities Acts.6 The notes in question were uncollateralized
and unsecured demand promissory notes.67 Without the applica-
tion of the securities laws, these notes would escape federal regula-
tion completely.68 No factors were found which served to mitigate
the inherent risk of the notes at issue.
69
The lower court found that the demand notes were uncharacter-
istic of a "security".7" The demand nature of the notes was held by
the court to be atypical of a security."1 Theoretically, demand
notes are capable of instant liquidity;72 instant liquidity was held
to be incompatible with the nature of investments.73
The Supreme Court concluded that the demand feature does not
eliminate risk unless and until payment is tendered to the deman-
dant.74 Demand notes are theoretically payable on demand.75 In
actuality, however, the demand and the transformation to cash
may not be simultaneous.76
The Court stated that the demand notes constituted "secu-
rit[ies]" under section 3(a)(10) of the Securities Exchange Act.1
7
Ernst & Young contended that these notes were exempted from
the definition of a "security" due to their demand nature, even if









72. Liquidity connotes the ability to convert a security into cash on the secondary
market without a substantial drop in price of the security or the ability to convert an asset
into cash. Dictionary of Finance and Investment Terms 213 (Barron's, 2d ed 1987).
73. Reves, 110 S Ct at 953.
74. Id. Common stock is the archetype of a security and stock is as readily liquid as a
demand note. Common stock may be more readily liquidated than demand notes due to the




78. Id. Section 3(a)(10)provides an exemption for certain instruments which would
otherwise constitute a "security" and be within the ambit of the Securities Exchange Act
Vol. 29:853860
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proposition, Ernst & Young cited Arkansas case law for the pro-
position that, for purposes of the statute of limitations, demand
notes are at maturity when issued. 79 The maturity of a note, how-
ever, was determined by the Court to be a question of federal
law. 0 The aim of the securities laws is to regulate investment
transactions.8 1 To read the exemption to exclude investment secur-
ities with a maturity not in excess of nine months would be incon-
sistent with the espoused Congressional intent.8 2 The Court reaf-
firmed earlier decisions which had concluded that the economic
reality of the transaction, not the literal Words of section 3(a)(10),
is the basis of determination as to whether the Securities Acts ap-
ply. 3 The plain words of the statute are not dispositive. Demand
notes were also determined not to necessarily have a short matur-
ity. 4 The exemption of notes with a maturity not in excess of nine
months were determined not to encompass the demand notes at
issue due to their investment nature.8 " The notes at issue here,
therefore, fell within both the "note" and "security" categories of
section 3(a)(10)of the Securities Exchange Act.'
While joining in the Majority opinion's rationale and conclusion,
Justice Stevens found substantial additional support for the major-
ity's holding in the reading of section 3(a)(10) of the Securities Ex-
change Act by the Courts of Appeals. 7 Where there is a settled
construction of a statute, that construction should not be dis-
were it not for the exemption. The exemption provides that the definition of a security does
not encompass: "currency or any note, draft, bill of exchange, or banker's acceptance which
has a maturity at the time of issuance of not exceeding nine months, exclusive of days of
grace, or any renewal thereof the maturity of which is likewise limited." 15 USC § 78c(a)(10)
(1987).
79. McMahon v O'Keefe, 213 Ark 105, 106, 209 SW2d 449, 450 (1948) (the statute of
limitations is triggered by the issuance of demand notes rather than the date of the first
redemption demand).
80. Reves, 110 S Ct at 954.
81. Id. See note 30 and accompanying text.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id at 955.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Sanders v John Nuveen & Co, 463 F2d 1075, 1080 (7th Cir 1972), cert denied,
409 US 1009 (1972) (When Congress spoke of notes with a maturity not in excess of nine
months, it meant commercial paper, not investment securities). See also Zeller v Bogue
Electric Manufacturing Corp, 476 F2d 795, 800 (2d Cir 1973), cert denied, 414 US 908
(1973); McClure v First National Bank, 497 F2d 490, 494 - 495 (5th Cir 1974), cert denied
420 US 130 (1975); Halloway v Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co 879 F2d 772, 778 (10th Cir
1989); Baurer v Planning Group, Inc, 215 U S App D C 384, 389-391, 669 F2d 770, 775-77
(D C Cir 1981).
1991
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turbed unless and until Congress decides to alter it.8 Once inter-
preted by the courts, a statute acquires a meaning just as if the
interpretation had been drafted by the Congress, such interpreta-
tion cannot be altered."9 A strong interest in enabling those who
are to be affected by a law to predict the legal consequences of a
proposed course of action, coupled with the interest in ensuring
that Congress legislates and the judiciary interprets the law, re-
quires that a settled construction be followed.9
Further support for this contention was found in the espoused
views of the Securities Exchange Commission, the body charged
with enforcing the securities laws.9 1 The Supreme Court has also
referred to the section 3(a)(10) exclusion for notes with a maturity
not in excess of nine months as an exclusion for commercial pa-
per.2 The legislative history of the Securities Exchange Act and
the Securities Act of 1933 evidence that the exclusion was only
meant to encompass commercial paper; the Securities Exchange
Commission has construed both the Securities Exchange Act and
the Securities Act in accordance with this view.9 3 For the reasons
espoused by the Court, and the above considerations, Justice Ste-
vens concurred in the finding that these notes were "securities"
within the ambit of the Securities Exchange Act.9 4
Chief Justice Rehnquist joined in the majority's opinion that the
notes in question were "securities" within the purview of the Se-
curities Exchange Act.9 ' Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented, how-
ever, from the Court's exclusion of the demand notes from the ex-
emption for notes with a maturity not in excess of nine months.9
Chief Justice Rehnquist advocated that, in construing the meaning
of words which are susceptible to more than one plausible con-
struction, the common understanding which existed at the time of
88. Reves, 110 S Ct at 956.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. See Securities and Exchange Commsn, Release No 33-4412, 26 Fed Reg 9158
(1961).
92. Reves, 110 S Ct at 956. SIA v Bd of Governors, 468 US 137, 150-152 (1984). Com-
mercial paper is a negotiable instrument or unsecured, short-term promissory note issued by
a corporation to solve a short term liquidity deficiency. Dictionary of Finance and Invest-
ment Terms 68 (Barron's, 2d ed 1987).
93. Reves, 110 S Ct at 957.
94. Id.
95. Id.




the drafting of the securities laws must be examined.9 7 Contempo-
raneous editions of legal dictionaries and caselaw revealed a preva-
lent comprehension in 1933 that demand notes were mature when
issued.9 8 The maturity date exemption, concluded the Chief Jus-
tice, encompassed demand notes, thus removing notes from the
scope of the Securities Exchange Act.99
The Chief Justice noted that Justice Stevens relied on the legis-
lative.history of the Securities Act to support his contention that
the 1934 Securities Exchange Act exclusion for notes with a matur-
ity not in excess of nine months encompassed only commercial pa-
per. 100 In the Chief Justice's view, the legislative history of the
1934 Act does not support this contention.'01 Furthermore, the re-
strictive nature of the exclusion is not evidenced to have survived
the enactment of the securities laws.102 The Chief Justice also
noted that the enacted language was broader than the proposed
language, evidencing an intent to afford an exemption to all notes
with a maturity of nine months or less.103 The exemption relied
upon in the Securities Act exempts the instruments from registra-
tion under the Act, but they are still subject to the Act's anti-fraud
provisions.104 The exemption in section 3(a)(10) of the 1934 Act
exempts instruments covered by the exclusion from the entirety of
the Act.10 5 The Chief Justice further concluded that the reading of
the exemption as one contextual exception does not render the
context clause superfluous, as Justice Stevens asserted.1 06 This
reading merely delineates one exemption, with the courts free to
flesh out the additional contextual exemptions.
10 7
Because Justice Rehnquist could find no justification for looking
beyond the literal words of section 3(a)(10), he concluded that de-
mand notes, due to their maturity upon issuance, were excluded
97. Id.
98. Id at 957-58.
99. Id at 958.
100. Id.
101. Id. See Securities and Exchange Commsn, Release No 33-4412, 26 Fed Reg 9158,
9159 (1961) (interpretation of section 3(a)(3) of Securities Act of 1933); Marine Bank v
Weaver, 455 US 551, 555-56 (1982); SIA v Bd of Governers, 468 US 137, 150-52 (1984).
102. Reves, 110 S Ct at 958.
103. Id.
104. Id. The anti-fraud provisions are found in section 10(b), 15 USC § 78j(b) (1982).
See note 14 and accompanying text.





from the ambit of the Securities Exchange Act.10 8 The dissenters
would have upheld the decision of the Court of Appeals."'
In 1931 and 1932 the Senate Banking Committee conducted in-
vestigations into the banking industry in the United States. A con-
gressional investigation of the securities market was conducted in
1933. The results of these investigations were numerous reports of
perceived abuses in the financial market.110 The committee hy-
pothesized that "speculation in weak securities" played a signifi-
cant role in causing the depression."'
The 1933-34 Congress enacted three acts to regulate the invest-
ment banking/securities field. 2 The Glass-Steagall Act, the popu-
lar name given to various provisions of the Banking Act of 1933,
was intended to effectuate a complete separation of the activities
of commercial bankers and investment bankers in order to fortify
the commercial banking system."' The Securities Act of 1933 was
enacted to provide full and fair disclosure of the character of se-
curities sold in interstate and foreign commerce and through the
mails, and to prevent frauds in the sale of such securities.' The
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 extended the protection underly-
ing the Securities Act to securities listed and registered for public
trading. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was enacted to pro-
vide for the regulation of securities exchanges and over-the-
counter markets operating in interstate and foreign commerce and
through the mails, to prevent inequitable and unfair practices on
such exchanges and markets. " ' The Securities Exchange Act at-
tempts to deal with three principal problems: "the excessive use of
credit for speculation, the unfair practices employed in specula-
tion, and the secrecy surrounding the financial condition of corpo-
108. Id'at 960.
109. Id.
110. Raymond Natter, Glass - Steagall Act Reform: The Next Banking Issue on the
Congressional Agenda, 35 Federal Bar News & Journal 185, 186 (1988). See also Law &
Business Securities Activities of Banks, 29-30 (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich 1984).
111. Natter, 35 Federal Bar News & Journal at 186 (cited in note 110). See also Com-
ment, Expansion of National Bank Powers: Regulatory and Judicial Precedent Under the
National Bank Act, Glass-Steagall Act, and Bank Holding Company Act, 36 SW L J 765,
779 (1982).
112. lanni, "Security" Under the Glass-Steagall Act and the Federal Securities Acts
of 1933 and 1934: The Direction of the Supreme Court's Analysis. 100 Bank L J 100, 103,
121 (cited in note 30).
113. Id.
114. See Preamble of the Securities Act of 1933, Pub L No 22 48 Stat 74 (1933), codi-
fied at 15 USC § 77(a) (1982).




rations which invite the public to purchase their securities. ' ' 1 6
The Glass-Steagall Act, the Securities Act of 1933 and the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934 were enacted in response to similar
problems, but each has a unique orientation. The Securities Act
and Securities Exchange Act require only that investors be fully
appraised of all material information prior to assuming a specula-
tive risk.' 17 They do not prohibit the assumption of speculative
risk. " 8 The Glass-Steagall Act prohibits commercial banks from
assuming speculative risks of securities, insulating depository
funds from speculative risk.119 Each Act is designed to remedy a
different problem which was inherent in the financial market prior
to its enactment.
20
A substantial amount of litigation has arisen under the New
Deal securities laws. 121 The Securities Acts contain a broad defini-
tion of "security, which calls for a case-by-case analysis in most
circumstances. The Glass-Steagall Act contains no definition of a
"security," but as the Securities Act was passed a fortnight later,
the definition of the Securities Act is used by the courts when
dealing with an issue under the Glass-Steagall Act.1
22
The development of the analysis under the Securities Acts has
evidenced a championing of "substance-over-form." The economic
realities of a transaction dictate the applicability of the Acts, as
opposed to the nomenclature used. 2 '
SEC v Joiner Corp.24 established a contextual framework of
analysis of a "security" under the 1933 Act. An action was brought
by the Securities and Exchange Commission (hereinafter, "SEC")
to restrain the Joiner Corporation from further violations of sec-
116. See S Rep 792, 73d Cong, 2d Sess (1934).
117. lanni, 100 Bank L J at 121-22 (cited in note 30).
118. Id at 122.
119. Id at 122-23.
120. See note 30 and accompanying text.
121. See note 123 and accompanying text.
122. A.G. Becker, Inc..v Bd of Governors, 519 F Supp 602 (D DC 1981), rev'd, 693 F2d
136, rev'd as SIA v Bd of Governors 468 US 137, 150-51 (1984).
123. See SEC v Joiner Corp., 320 US 344 (1943); SEC v Howey Co, 328 US 293 (1946);
Tcherepnin v Knight, 389 US 332 (1967); McClure v First National Bank of Lubbock,
Texas, 497 F2d 490 (5th Cir 1974); United Housing Foundation, Inc. v Forman, 421 US 837
(1975); Exchange National Bank v Touche Ross & Co., 544 F2d 1126 (2d Cir 1976); Marine
Bank v Weaver, 455 US 551 (1982); SIA v Bd of Governors, 468 US 137 (1984); Hunssinger
v Rockford Business Credits, 745 F2d 484 (7th Cir 1984); Chemical Bank v Arthur Ander-
son Co., 726 F2d 930 (2d Cir 1984) ; Landreth Timber Co. v Landreth, 471 US 681 (1985) ;
Futura Development Corp.v Centex Corp., 761 F2d 33 (1st Cir 1985); Underhill v Royal,
769 F2d 1426 (9th Cir 1985).
124. 320 US 344 (1943)
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tions 5(a) and 17(a)(2) and (3) of the Securities Act of 1933.115
Joiner engaged in a campaign to sell assignments of oil leases with
a corresponding service contract. 2 '
The Supreme Court, per Justice Jackson, opined that the test to
determine whether an instrument is within the scope of the Securi-
ties Act is the "character the instrument is given in commerce by
the terms of the offer, the plan of distribution, and the economic
inducements held out to the prospect.""2 7 Documents in which
there is common trading for a speculative or investment purpose
were included within the ambit of the Securities Acts. If the in-
strument is an investment in substance, it falls under the Acts due
to its inherent risk. If the offering class is sufficiently broad, the
instrument also embodies the dangers sought to be prevented by
the Securities Acts. The Supreme Court determined that the as-
signments of oil leases which were sold by Joiner constituted an
"investment contract" and an interest or instrument commonly
known as a "security. 128
The terms of the lease created a form of investment contract
because the purchaser was paying both for a lease and for a devel-
opment project.12' 9 Because the oil survey venture was enmeshed in
these leases in both an economic and legal sense the defendants
were held to be offered more than naked leasehold rights.1 30 The
economic interest in drilling furnished a substantial portion of the
value of the instruments sold. The drilling venture conducted by
Joiner gave the purchase its allure. 13 ' Trading in this endeavor had
all the evils inherent in the securities transactions that the Securi-
ties Act was intended to eviscerate.
1 32
The rules of statutory construction which were advanced to show
that the instruments in question were outside the purview of sec-
tion 2(1) of the Securities Act were rejected by the Court1 33 be-
125. 320 US at 345. Section 5a is codified as amended in 15 USC § 77e. Sections
17(a)(2) and (3) are codified as amended in 15 USC § 77q.
126. Joiner, 320 US at 345.
127. Id at 352-53.





133. Id. Joiner espoused an adherence to "ejusdem generis" (to condense the more
general terms to include only those which are substantially similar to the specific terms
which follow) and to "expressio unius est exclusio alterius" (to show that the absence of an
express inclusion constitutes its exclusion where the statute in question makes explicit refer-
ence to other instruments). Id at 350.
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cause the legislative purpose for enacting the Securities Act was
deemed to champion over canons of statutory construction. 13 The
definition of a "security" was drafted to include by name or
description many instruments or schemes in which there is com-
mon trading for speculation or investment.1 35 Excising or constrict-
ing the broad definitional terms to include only those instruments
which substantially conform to the specified instruments listed in
section 2(1) would render the general terms superfluous.13 6 If an
instrument is established to be an investment contract or a holding
or instrument commonly known as a security, they are brought
within the ambit of the Acts.
1 37
SEC v Howey Co., 38 decided two-and-a-half years after Joiner,
established the definition of an "investment contract" for purposes
of the 1933 Act. Howey involved a suit by the Securities and Ex-
change Commission to enjoin the Howey Co. from using the "mails
and instrumentalities of interstate commerce in the offer and sale
of unregistered and non-exempt securities in violation of § 5(a) of
the Act.
1 39
The Securities Act does not define an "investment contract."' 4 °
An "investment contract" had been judicially defined prior to the
enactment of the Securities Act to encompass a contract or scheme
which extends capital or money to secure income or profit from its
employment in a venture."' The pre-existing judicial interpreta-
tion of the term had infused meaning to the term "investment con-
tract." "2 That interpretation comports with the intent of the Se-
curities Act.143 This definition was determined to embody the
necessary flexibility capable of encompassing the myriad possible
schemes seeking to use third party capital to bring profit.' The




138. 328 US 293 (1946).
139. Id at 294.
140. Id at 298.
141. Id. See also, State v Gopher Tire & Rubber Co, 146 Minn 52, 56, 177 NW 937,
938 (1920).
142. Howey, 328 US at 298.
143. Id. The court defined an investment contract as: "a contract, transaction or
scheme whereby a person invests his money in a common enterprise and is led to expect
profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party, it being immaterial whether
the shares in the enterprise are evidenced by formal certificates or by nominal interests in
the physical assets employed in the enterprise." Id at 298-99.
144. Id at 299.
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term was broadly construed to afford investors a substantial degree
of protection.14 The transactions in question were found to be the
paradigm of an "investment contract" under the promulgated
definition. 1"
The Howey Co. offered an opportunity to contribute funds to a
pool of assets and to share in the profits of the enterprise collec-
tively managed and partly owned by the Howey Co.1 7 The integral
"elements of a profit-seeking business venture" were found to be
present. 14 8 The scheme in question involved the investment of cap-
ital in a common enterprise, investors were not afforded any voice
in the management and the profits were to come solely from the
efforts of others. The plan was determined to fall within the cate-
gory of an "investment contract" under the Securities Acts. '49
The Court extended its focus on the substance of the transaction
and the "investment contract" test espoused by the Howey Court
(under the 1933 Act) to the 1934 Act in Tcherepnin v Knight.5 0 In
that case, holders of withdrawable capital shares in City Savings
Association of Chicago filed a class action suit on behalf of more
than 5,000 investors,1 5 1 alleging that the sale of the capital shares
was void under section 29(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934152 because the capital shares constituted a security under sec-
tion 3(a)(10). 151 In an attempt to develop the definition of a secur-
ity under the Securities Exchange Act, the Supreme Court relied
on the settled definition of a security under the Securities Act.
1 4
The Supreme Court determined that the withdrawable capital
shares most closely resembled an "investment contract". 155 The




148. Id at 300.
149. Id.
150. 389 US 332 (1975).
151. Tcherepnin, 389 US at 333, n.2.
152. Id. Section 29(b) is codified as amended at 15 USC section 78cc(b), which states
that any contract made in violation of the Securities Act is void. 15 USC § 78cc(b) (1987).
153. Id. Codified at 15 USC § 78c(a)(10) (1987).
154. Tcherepnin, 389 US at 336. Because the same Congress had passed both Acts and
the legislative history of the 1934 Act asserts that the 1933 Act definition of a security was
"substantially the same" as the 1934 Act, the Court utilized the established definition under
the 1933 Act, which was also used in SEC v Howey and SEC v Joiner. Id at 336, 342.
155. Id at 336. The withdrawable capital shares were found to also constitute "certifi-
cate[s] of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement," "stock" or "transfer-
rable shares." Id at 339-40.
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with profits to come solely from the efforts of others. 5 ' The total-
ity of the savings and loan's assets were derived from the issuance
of these instruments, evidencing an offering to a broad class. Be-
cause the return on the initial investment was dependent upon the
profits of the association, it was a speculative venture. 57 The es-
sential characteristics of an "investment contract" were found to
exist in this enterprise; the Securities Acts were, therefore, deter-
mined to govern the venture. 5s
McClure v First National Bank of Lubbock, Texas' 59 further
honed the "investment/commercial" analysis. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit faced the issues of whether a
promissory note, which is given jointly with a trust deed for a bank
loan, constitutes a security under the Securities Acts and, whether
the commitment of corporate stock for renewal of a bank loan con-
stitutes a sale under the Securities Acts.'
The Fifth Circuit determined that the Act was inapplicable be-
cause the transactions in question involved commercial, not invest-
ment, transactions.'6" The Bank and the Corporation were in-
volved in the exchange of collateral related to a commercial loan.
The notes were not offered to a class of investors, nor were they
acquired by the lender for any speculative purpose.6 2 The corpora-
tion did not receive investment capital in return for its notes.'
The nature of the note was held to control the applicability of the
Act.'" 4 The exemption based upon maturity length was not consid-
ered. The sole question which was addressed was the nature of the
instrument.'6 5 The exemption for notes with a maturity not in ex-
cess of nine months became surplus verbiage.'
The second argument advanced by the petitioner was that her
156. Id at 338 (quoting SEC v Howey, 328 US at 293, 298).
157. Tcherepnin, 389 US at 338.
158. Id at 339.
159. 497 F2d 490 (5th Cir 1974).
160. McClure, 497 F2d at 491.
161. Id. The court "realize[d] that [its] holding ... virtually writes the exemption
[for notes with a maturity not in excess of nine months] out of the law" in the Fifth Circuit.
Id. Commercial notes were determined to be outside of the ambit of the Act, regardless of
their term of maturity. The exemption for investment paper with a maturity of less than
nine months had previously been rendered void by prior judicial decision. When the prece-
dential caselaw was coupled with the exclusion for commercial notes, regardless of their
term of maturity, the exemption was rendered superfluous. Id.
162. Id at 492.
163. Id.
164. Id at 495.
165. Id at 492-93.
166. Id at 495.
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pledge of corporate stock in consideration for renewal of the loan
constituted a sale of a security, and, therefore, should have been
afforded the protection of the Securities Exchange Act. The court
also rejected this argument."6 7
United Housing Foundation v Forman'8 followed the guiding
principal set forth in Joiner, Howey, and Tcherepnin. The Court's
focus was on the substance and economic reality of the underlying
transaction. Co-op City was a cooperative housing project for low
cost housing, which sold "shares" of "stock" to prospective apart-
ment purchasers. 1 6  Fifty-seven residents brought'suit on their own
behalf and on behalf of the housing corporation, alleging violations
of the anti-fraud provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in connection with the sale of the
"shares" of "stock" in the cooperative. 17°
Although the shares were designated as "securities," the Court
concluded, they exhibited none of the characteristics which are
commonly attributable to "stock.' ' 7 1 The Supreme Court held
that, in defining a "security" under the Securities Acts,' 7 2 Congress
was seeking to broadly define the term to allow flexibility of appli-
cation where appropriate.17 3 The shares purchased by the residents
were determined "not [to] represent any of the 'countless and vari-
167. Id. The acceptance by a creditor of a stock pledge as collateral in a privately
negotiated transaction does not bring a transaction which is outside the ambit of the Securi-
ties Acts within their scope. Id. The court examined decisions under the Securities Act of
1933 which ruled that "the pledge of unregistered stock as loan collateral is a 'sale,' "how-
ever, all of the decisions involved the subsequent sale of the pledged securities following the
default of the covenanting party. The subsequent foreclosure and sale of pledged securities
forced the bank to assume the role of a securities underwriter. Without a foreclosure and
resultant sale, the pledge of stocks does not constitute a "sale" under section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Id.
168. 421 US 837 (1975).
169. Forman, 421 US at 838.
170. Id.
171. Id. The instruments at issue did not possess the characteristics of negotiability or
proportional voting rights, nor the right to receive dividends, the right to pledge or encum-
ber the interest, or to gain access to a secondary market in order to sell the instrument. The
stock in this case was not speculative in nature. Id. Typically, shares of stock are evidences
of ownership of a corporation represented by shares that are a claim on the corporation's
earnings and assets. Holders are entitled to vote on the selection of directors and other
important matters. Voting rights are conferred based upon the number of outstanding
shares held. Holders are also entitled to a proportionate distribution of dividends if and
when they are distributed.- Stock is freely negotiable and transferrable on the secondary
market. Dictionary of Finance and Investment Terms 399-400 (Barron's, 2d ed 1987).
172. Forman, 421 US at 847. The Court treated the definition of a security and the
coverage of both of the Securities Acts the same. Id.
173. Id. See H R No 85, 73d Cong, 1st Sess 11 (1933).
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able schemes devised by those who seek the use of money of others
on the promise of profits' . . . and therefore do not fall within 'the
ordinary concept of a security'. 1 7  The Securities Acts were
designed to serve as a prophylactic against abuses in the previously
unregulated securities market.'7
The Court defined the distinguishing factor between investment
contracts or securities and a commercial endeavor, which is outside
the scope of the Securities Acts, as whether the scheme involves an
investment of money in a common enterprise with profits derived
solely from the efforts of third parties.'7 6 In Forman, the impetus
to acquire the shares in question was to obtain low cost housing
and was not motivated by an expectation of profit. 77 The profit
motive inherent in a security was-absent in this case.'1
7
Exchange National Bank v Touche Ross & Co. 179 further culti-
vated the "investment/commercial" distinction by way of a com-
parison of the disputed instruments to notes which are outside the
coverage of the Securities Acts due to their commercial nature (the
"Family Resemblence test"). Exchange National Bank purchased
three unsecured '80 subordinated' 8' demand notes 8 2 from a New
York Brokerage firm.'8 3 Violations of 'both the Securities Act of
1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 were alleged by Ex-
change National Bank.
18 4
174. Forman, 421 US at 848 (citing Howey, 328 US at 299).
175. Forman, 421 US at 849. The concentration of the Securities Acts is "on the capi-
tal market . . . the sale of securities to raise capital for profit-making purposes, the ex-
changies on which the securities are traded, and the need for regulation to prevent fraud and
to protect the interest of investors." Id.
176. Id at 852. See also, Howey, 328 US at 301.
177. Forman, 421 US at 853.
178. Id at 858. Here the shares were a personal consumption expenditure. Id.
179. 544 F2d 1126 (2d Cir 1976).
180. Id. The notes were not backed by assets pledged to assure repayment of the debt.
Dictionary of Finance and Investment Terms 458 (Barron's, 2d ed 1987).
181. Exchange National Bank, 544 F2d at 1126. The claims were subject to a superior
lien of another creditor and, therefore, were entitled to satisfaction only after the satisfac-
tion of the superior lien. Dictionary of Finance and Investment Terms 409 (Barron's, 2d ed
1987).
182. Exchange National Bank, 544 F2d at 1126. The notes were payable upon written
demand "at least six (6) months prior to [the maturity] date, or upon such date thereafter
as may be specified by the lender upon written demand" received at least six months prior
to the demand date. Id at 1128.
183. Id. The notes were to reach maturity one year, one year and three months, and
one year and six months after the purchase respectively. Id.
184. Id at 1127. The alleged violations included an allegation of the breach of section
17(a) of the Securities Act, sections 10(b), 18(a), 15(c) and 17(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act, SEC Rule 10-b and a pendent state claim for negligence. Id. The claim is based upon
Duquesne Law Review
The "family resemblance" test espoused by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit began with a presumption
that any note is a security.'85 The presumption can be rebutted by
evidencing that the note in question bears a strong family resem-
blance to a list of enumerated notes which would fall outside the
ambit of a "security" under the Securities Acts. 8" All of the list
members fall within the commercial sphere. The list members are
evidenced by private negotiability for a set amount which is not
subject to the efforts of a third party and are not speculative by
nature. To determine whether a note which has a maturity in ex-
cess of nine months constitutes a security for the purposes of the
Securities Acts, the note in question was compared by the Court to
the espoused list.187 The Court stated that if the note does not bear
a strong family resemblance to these examples, section 10(b) of the
1934 Act should apply. 188 Following the "family resemblence" test
and finding no strong resemblance to the promulgated list, the cir-
cuit court determined that the transaction in question was subject
to the coverage of the Securities Acts.189
The Supreme Court focused on the regulatory aspect of the Se-
curities Acts in Marine Bank v Weaver.190 The Court noted the
regulatory power of the banking laws as a reason for defining a
certificate of deposit (hereinafter, "CD") as outside the reach of
the Securities Acts. 91 At issue was the purchase of a CD which was
later pledged to the Marine Bank to guarantee a loan issued to a
third party, against which the bank had a pre-existing debt.192 The
plaintiffs alleged that the bank misrepresented the proposed use
for the third party loan without their knowledge, and thereby vio-
conduct of Touche Ross as the accounting firm for the brokerage firm. Id at 1128.
185. Reves, 110 S Ct at 952.
186. Exchange National Bank, 544 F2d at 1138. The notes which do not constitute
"securities" consists of "the note delivered in consumer financing, the note secured by a
mortgage on a home, the short-term note secured by a lien on a small business or some of its
assets, the note evidencing a 'character' loan to a bank customer, short-term notes secured
by an assignment of accounts receivable, or a note which simply formalizes an open-account
debt incurred in the ordinary course of business . ." Id.
187. Reves, 110 S Ct at 952-53.
188. Id.
189. Exchange National Bank, 544 F2d at 1138-39.
190. 455 US 551 (1982).
191. Weaver, 455 US at 558. A certificate of deposit is a debt instrument issued by a
bank that usually pays interest at a rate which is set by the financial market. Maturity can
range from a few months to years. Dictionary of Finance and Investment Terms 59-60
(Barron's, 2d ed 1987).
192. Weaver, 455 US at 553.
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lated section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act." 3
The Supreme Court examined the nature of the transaction and
its economic attributes and found that the CD was not within the
ambit of the securities laws. 94 The holder of a CD is guaranteed
payment by the FDIC, whereas other long term debts assume the
risk of default by the borrower.19 5 Finding adequate protection
under the banking laws, the Court found no necessity to subject
issuers of CD's to the provisions of the Securities Acts. 196 The CD
was accordingly found to be outside the scope of the Securities
Acts. "'97
Subsequently, another issue involving the sale of commercial pa-
per came before the Court in SIA v Bd of Governors."9 8 Bankers
Trust began functioning as an agent for several of its corporate
customers in marketing their commercial paper.'99 The Securities
Industry Association (SIA) asserted that the merchandising of
third-party commercial paper constituted a breach of sections 16
and 21 of the Glass-Steagall Act.
20 0
The Supreme Court asserted that the emphasis on the fact that
commercial paper was a relatively low risk instrument, that com-
mercial banks had traditionally purchased commercial paper for
their own accounts, and that commercial paper was chiefly sold to
a sophisticated class of investors was misguided.2 0 ' The safety of a
particular investment was not the determining factor as to the un-
derwriting prohibitions enacted by Congress. 02 Exceptions were
193. Id at 554.
194. Id at 558-59.
195. Id at 558.
196. Id at 559.
197. Id. The Court opined that this agreement was also not the type of instrument
that comes to mind when the term 'security' was used and, therefore, it did not fall within
the common perception of a security which would be subject to the Securities Acts. Id at
559-60.
198. 519 F Supp 602 (D DC 1981), rev'd 693 F2d 136, rev'd as SIA v Bd of Governors,
468 US 137 (1984).
199. SIA, 468 US at 140. Commercial paper refers generally to negotiable instruments
or unsecured, short-term promissory notes issued by corporations to solve short-term liquid-
ity deficiencies. Dictionary of Finance and Investment Terms 68 (Barron's, 2d ed 1987).
200. SIA, 468 US at 140. Sections 16 and 21 of the Glass-Steagall Act separate bank-
ing from securities on a transactional level. Although section 16 applies only to national
banks by its terms, section 5(c) of the Glass-Steagall Act provides that: "[sitate [Federal
Reserve] member banks shall be subject to the same limitations and conditions ...as are
applicable ...[to] national banks" under section 16. 12 USC § 335 (1988). Bankers Trust
Co. was a state commercial bank which was a Federal Reserve System member and, there-
fore, subject to the Glass-Steagall Act. SIA, 468 US at 137, 148.
201. Id at 158.
202. Id at 156-57.
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not accorded to sophisticated investors or purchasers. 0 3 The Su-
preme Court declared that "the Act's ...prohibition on under-
writing reflects Congress' conclusion that the mere existence of a
securities operation, 'no matter how carefully and conservatively
run, is inconsistent with the best interests of the bank as a
whole."
20 4
The Court conceded that one of the impetuses behind the Glass-
Steagall Act was to re-channel bank investments toward more
short-term innocuous investments." 5 However, only the invest-
ment in commercial paper by a commercial bank was counte-
nanced, not the underwriting thereof
20 6
The Supreme Court's focus was section 16 of the Glass-Steagall
Act, which provides in part that the "business of dealing in securi-
ties and stock by the association shall be limited to purchasing and
selling such securities and stock without recourse, solely upon the
order, and for the account of, customers, and in no case for its own
account.
'20 7
The Court found that national banks are prohibited from under-
writing any issue of securities or stock under section 16 and that
section 21 prohibits any corporation which is engaged in selling,
underwriting, issuing, or distributing stocks, bonds, debentures,
notes, or other securities from engaging in banking activities.0 " As
a depositary, the prohibitions of both sections were apropos. 20 9 The
Court held that if commercial paper constituted a "security," its
underwriting would be an illegal activity for a bank.210
The Glass-Steagall Act does not define "notes" or "securities."
The Court reasoned that the prosaic meaning of the terms, "as
used by the 1933 Congress[,] encompasses commercial paper.
'211
Reading the Glass-Steagall Act in para materia with the Banking
203. Id at 159.
204. Id at 157, quoting 75 Cong Rec 9913 (1932) (remarks of Sen. Bulkey, quoting a
statement issued by the Bank of Manhattan Trust Co.). See also, Harvey L. Pitt, 1 The Law
of Financial Services 321-22 (1988 & Supp 1990-92).
205. SIA, 468 US at 142.
206. Id at 157. Underwriting involves an agreement made prior to the issuance of
shares of stock that a set number of shares will be guaranteed. Dictionary of Finance and
Investment Terms, 451-52 (Barron's, 2d ed 1987).
207. 12 USC § 24 (1984).
208. SIA, 468 US at 157. Section 16, germane solely to national banks by its terms, is
made applicable to state banks which are members of the Federal Reserve System through
the operation of section 5 (c) of the Act (12 USC § 335 (1982)). SIA, 468 US at 148-49.
209. SIA, 468 US at 148-49.
210. Id at 149.
211. Id at 150.
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Act of 1933, the Securities Act of 1933, and the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, it was determined to be evident that commer-
cial paper was encompassed within the term security. 1 ' In each of
the above acts, "security" includes commercial paper within its de-
notation. Explicit exceptions exempted commercial paper in some
situations.213 The exempting of commercial paper from the scope
of the above acts under specific circumstances demonstrates a con-
gressional understanding that commercial paper falls within the
ambit of "security."214 The underwriting of third party commercial
paper is, therefore, a prohibited activity for a bank under sections
16 and 21 of the Glass-Steagall Act.
2 15
In Hunssinger v Rockford Business Credits, the Seventh Circuit
Court reinforced the necessity to look beyond nomenclature to the
circumstances of the questioned transaction. 2 6 A purchaser filed
suit alleging violation of sections 5 and 12 of the 1933 Act and sec-
tion 10(b) of the 1934 Act.217 Rockford Business Credits sold notes
which had a maturity term of one year and a fixed rate of interest
to the general public.2 18 Each note was part of a larger capital of-
fering and the notes were referred to as investments in communi-
cations by the seller.21 9
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held
that neither the fact that the return is a floating rate of interest
2 0
nor the short maturity term of one year is dispositive. 2 1 The deter-
mining factor is the substance of the transaction. The transaction
at issue was determined to have none of the "paradigms of a com-
mercial loan. '222 Public solicitation of persons seeking a passive re-
turn on a capital outlay and the sale of units in a larger offering
were stated to constitute hallmarks of an investment transac-
tion.22 '3 Rockford Business Credits also referred to the transaction
as an investment repeatedly in correspondence. 24 A reasonable
212. Id at 150-51.
213. Id at 151, n. 7. See 15 USC § 7 7 c(a)(3 ).
214. SIA, 468 US at 160.
215. Id.
216. 745 F2d 484 (7th Cir 1984).
217. Hunssinger, 745 F2d at 487. Section 12 is codified as amended in 15 USC § 771.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Hunssinger, 745 F2d 486. The rate of interest was a floating rate which was calcu-
lated upon the prime rate on a monthly basis. Id.
221. Id at 492.
222. Id at 493.
223. Id at 492.
224. Id at 493.
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man could justifiably assume that the Securities Acts were applica-
ble.22 The court held that the notes in question, therefore, fall
within the purview of the Securities Acts. 2 6
The "sale of business" doctrine and the requirement of depen-
dance upon the efforts of a third party to obtain a profit return
was renounced in Landreth Timber Co. v Landreth.227 All of the
outstanding stock of a lumber company was privately owned.2 8
The outstanding stock was sold and the Landreth Timber Co. was
formed.2 29 The purchasers later sold the mill at a loss and went
into receivership.2 30 The purchasers brought suit, alleging a viola-
tion of the Securities Act of 1933 by failing to register stock which
had been widely offered.231 A violation of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 was also alleged due to perceived misrepresentations
concerning the stock.2 3
The Supreme Court opined that the stock which was involved
"possesses all of the characteristics . . . identified in Forman as
traditionally associated with common stock. '233 The context of the
transaction in question, however, unlike that which was involved in
Forman, is a paradigm of the type of context in which the "Acts
normally apply. '234 It is plausible in this circumstance that the
purchaser would reasonably believe the Securities Acts to govern
the exchange, and under the circumstances, the plain meaning of
the statutory denotation should be determinative. 2 5 The stock
should be considered to be subject to the coverage of the Securities
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. 471 US 681 (1985). A large number of courts had previously held that the Securi-
ties Acts are inapplicable where 100% of the stock of a closely-held corporation was sold,
because the purchaser did not enter the transaction with the expectation of profit stemming
from the efforts of others. The transaction, therefore, was held to constitute a commercial
venture rather than a typical investment, because managerial control was transferred to the
purchasers. See United Housing Foundation v Forman, 421 US 837 (1985) and SEC v
Howey Co., 328 US 293 (1946). Landreth, 471 US at 685.
228. Id at 683.
229. Id.
230. Id. Receivership is a form of bankruptcy whereby a court-appointed person takes
possession of, but not title to, the assets or affairs of the business. The court appointed
Receiver collects the income and rents and manages the assets for the benefit of the owners
and creditors until the court enters a disposition. Dictionary of Finance and Investment
Terms 327 (Barron's, 2d ed 1987).
231. Landreth, 471 US at 683.
232. Id.






The Court went on to examine the contention that it should ad-
dress the economic substance of the transaction to determine
whether the Howey test had been met.2 37 The stock in question,
however, was espoused to be blatantly within the statutory defini-
tion, so as to render further analysis unnecessary.2 38 The Court
found no reason to look beyond the characteristics of the
instrument.1
3 9
In Futura Development v Centex,24 ° the United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit examined the various tests which
were espoused by sundry other circuits to determine the presence
of a "security. ' 24 1 The "investment/commercial" test was adopted
due to the belief that it could best effectuate the inherent goals of
the Securities Acts. 242  Futura entered into an agreement to
purchase an undeveloped tract of land from Chestnut, a wholly-
owned subsidiary of Centex.24 3 Futura agreed to release a portion
of the property (hereinafter, "Section One") to Chestnut without
any further payment.244 Other portions were to be released upon
the payment of a specified sum per plot.245 Chestnut defaulted on
the first installment due on the promissory note.24 According to
the affidavit of Futura's Executive Vice-President, Centex agreed
to assume and guarantee payment.4 7 Section One was then re-
leased and Chestnut immediately retired the mortgage on the Sec-
236. Id.
237. Id at 690. The Court has previously looked to the "economic realities of the
transaction, rather than the label attached to the instrument to demarcate the scope and
coverage of the Securities Acts. See United Housing Foundation v Forman, 421 US 837
(1985), SEC v Joiner Corp., 320 US 344 (1943), and SEC v Howey Co., 328 US 293 (1946).
Landreth, 471 US at 688-89.
238. Id at 690. Stock in its traditional form "represents to many people, both trained
and untrained in business matters, the paradigm of a security." Id at 693, citing Daily v
Morgan, 701 F2d 496 (5th Cir 1983) (internal quotation omitted). Stock "is so quintessen-
tially a security as to foreclose further analysis." Id at 694 (citing L. Loss, Fundamentals of
Securities Regulation 211-12 (1983)) (internal quotation omitted).
239. Landreth, 471 US at 690.
240. 761 F2d 33 (1st Cir 1985).
241. Futura, 761 F2d at 39-41. See note 37 and accompanying text.
242. Futura 761 F2d at 39-40.
243. Id at 36. The purchase price was tendered subject to a tri-partied agreement: a
portion was to be a cash settlement; Chestnut was to assume the outstanding mortgage; and







tion One acreage.248 Chestnut subsequently defaulted on the sec-
ond installment due under the promissory note.249
Futura filed an action in contract fifteen months after the first
default, three months after the default on the second installment,
to collect the outstanding principal and interest due.25 The trial
court251 held that the only available remedy lay in foreclosure of
the remaining tract (Section Two). The Puerto Rico Supreme
Court affirmed.252
Later,: Futura filed suit in the federal district court, alleging
fraud under the Securities Acts.253 Futura alleged that Chestnut
represented it was interested in the acquisition of the entire tract,
but was in fact only interested in Section One.254
The "investment/commercial" test was adopted by the First Cir-
cuit, due to the belief that the test could best effectuate the inher-
ent goal of the Securities Acts because "it focuses on the investor's
dependency upon the efforts of the others. 255 The fact that the
note was negotiated between the parties, was for a definite amount,
had a set rate of interest, and that the value was independent of
the efforts of Chestnut strongly suggested that the context of the
transaction was a commercial, rather than an investment transac-
tion.2"' The note was therefore determined to be outside the scope
of the Securities Acts.257
Underhill v Royal255 also involved a refinement of the focus on
the "economic realities" of the instrument. Two companies were
founded by Royal.259 The National Mortgage Exchange (hereinaf-
ter, "NME") established franchises for a mortgage brokerage busi-
ness. The National Mortgage Exchange of Southern California
(hereinafter, "NMESC") was also active as a mortgage broker, but
additionally operated a loan agreement program. NMESC entered
into a franchise agreement with NME, whereby it was authorized
248. Id at 36-37.
249. Id at 37.
250. Id.
251. Id. Suit was filed in the Puerto Rico Superior Court. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id at 38. Prior to the sales contract for the entire region, Chestnut had attempted
to negotiate for the purchase of Section One alone. Futura refused, believing that the prop-
erty was worth more as a totality than subdivided. Id at 35-6.
255. Id at 40.
256. Id at 41.
257. Id at 42.
258. 769 F2d 1426 (9th Cir 1985).
259. Royal, 769 F2d at 1429.
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to operate under the name of NME in its mortgage brokerage busi-
ness.2 60 The loan agreement program" ' was advertised over the ra-
dio, in newspapers, and in brochures which were distributed by
NMESC.6 2 The brochures advertised a ten percent return on prin-
cipal. The brochures were replete with references to the NME, but
the sole reference to the NMESC was at the end, under the signa-
tures of the officers of NMESC. The plan was designed to restrict
sales to residents of California, in order to avoid the registration
requirements of the federal securities laws.2 63 Some of the investors
were from other states, however.64
NMESC filed for bankruptcy and the noteholders were deemed
to be unsecured creditors.2 65 Following the Chapter 11 filing, a
noteholder brought suit alleging failure to register the securities
pursuant to the federal Securities Acts, and violation of the anti-
fraud provisions of the Securities Acts. 26 The complainants ob-
jected to the reorganization plan which was approved by the ma-
jority of other noteholders.26
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held
that the nature of the Secured Contractual Loan Program evi-
denced a representation to a wide basis of the public of a prear-
ranged plan to create a general fund to invest in notes secured by
trust deeds.26 8 There was little, if any, opportunity to negotiate
terms and the Secured Contractual Loan Program was not charac-
teristic of a commercial lending transaction.2 6 9 The impetus to par-
ticipate was the advertised 10% return on principal.27 0 The court
concluded that the program constituted a security within the fed-
eral securities laws.
27 1
The Reves Court combined the emphasis on the economic reali-
260. Id.
261. Id. NMESC borrowed money from lenders. Repayment of the debts was dictated
by a corollary contract, the "collateral loan agreement/promissory note." The notes had ma-
turity terms of between one and three years and promised a rate of return of ten percent
above principal. NMESC would then use the borrowed funds to buy third party promissory






267. Id at 1430.
268. Id at 1431.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id at 1435.
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ties of the instrument in question with an emphasis on the regula-
tory aspect of the Securities Acts.27 Recognizing that the 1933-34
Congress intended to encompass within the Securities Acts virtu-
ally any instrument which might be sold as an investment, the
Court focused upon the incidents which. characterized the instru-
ment in the marketplace21 3 The nature of the investment remains
the focal point of the analysis.2 7' This focus ensures that the spirit
of the Securities Acts is fulfilled, while giving deference to the let-
ter of the law.
The Second Circuit established a list of instruments which were
commonly known as notes, but were outside the scope of the Se-
curities Acts2 7 5 To determine the applicability of the Securities
Acts, a note in question was compared to the espoused list to de-
termine whether the instrument in question bore a strong resem-
blance to the list of notes which fall outside the purview of the
Securities Acts. 76 This test, the "family resemblance" test, was
adopted and further refined by. the Supreme Court in Reves.2
There, a questioned note was examined to determine whether the
motivation of the buyer and seller which underlay the transaction
was of an investment rather than a commercial nature.7 8 The plan
of distribution was examined to determine whether the instrument
was of the type that is characterized by common trading for a
speculative purpose.27 9 The common perception of the transaction
was examined to determine whether it was perceived to be an in-
vestment transaction rather than a commercial venture.2 80 The fi-
nal consideration was whether factors were in existence which
would render the applicability of the Securities Acts unneces-
sary.281 The Securities Acts were drafted in. order to require full
disclosure of the risks inherent in any speculative transaction.282
Any instrument which is an investment by nature is subject to the
provisions of the Securities Acts, 283 but a commercial transaction is
272. See notes 27 and 28 and accompanying text.
273. See note 30 and accompanying text.
274. See note 42 and accompanying text.
275. Exchange National Bank, 544 F2d 1126 (2d Cir 1976).
276. See note 47 and accompanying text.
277. Reves, 110 S Ct at 951-52.
278. See notes 48-53 and accompanying text.
279. See notes 54 to 58 and accompanying text.
280. See notes 59 to 64 and accompanying text.
281. See notes 65 to 69 and accompanying text.
282. See note 30 and accompanying text.
283. Reves, 110 S Ct at 954.
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immune from the scope of the Securities Acts.
Although the Securities Exchange Act and the Securities Act
provide an exemption for notes with a maturity not in excess of
nine months, this exemption is a qualified exclusion.2 84 The defini-
tion section of the Securities Exchange Act states that the defini-
tions are general in nature. If the context otherwise requires, the
strict letter of the law is capable of flexibility. The spirit of the
Acts mandates that these notes be considered as within the Securi-
ties Acts due to their investment nature28
The motivations behind the transaction characterize the ex-
change as an investment transaction.2 8 The notes were sold in a
common offering.28 Due to the advertising scheme and the adver-
tised rate of return, the public justifiably perceived the instru-
ments as a security venture.2 8 If the Acts were held not to apply to
the notes in question, they would not be subject to any federal reg-
ulation.289 These factors require that the vehicle be governed by
the Securities Acts, in spite of the exemption under section
3(a)(10).
Justice Stevens' concurrence found additional support for the
holding in the prior construction which was given to the exemp-
tion.290 The construction which had been given to the exemption
by the courts and the SEC was as solely an exclusion for commer-
cial paper.291 The legislative history also spoke of the exemption as
exclusive to commercial paper. 92 This narrow construction is not
in accord with the spirit or the letter of the law.293
The Acts were drafted in broad terms in order to afford the
courts latitude to effectuate the purpose underlying the Securities
reform. The use of credit for speculative purposes is the quintes-
sential securities exchange. 294 To allow categorization of an instru-
ment based on a single facet of the instrument serves to vitiate the
purpose of the law.2 19 This concept is reinforced by the strict letter
284. See note 27 and accompanying text.
285. See lanni, 100 Bank L J 100, 103 (cited in note 30).
286. See notes 48 to 53 and accompanying text.
287. See notes 54 to 58 and accompanying text.
288. See notes 59 to 64 and accompanying text.
289. See notes 65 to 69 and accompanying text.
290. See note 87 and accompanying text.
291. Securities and Exchange Commsn, Release No 33-4412, 26 Fed Reg 9158 (1961).
292. Reves, 110 S Ct 957.
293. See note 123 and accompanying text.
294. See Ianni, 100 Bank L J 100, 103 (cited in note 30).
295. See note .37 and accompanying text.
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of section 3(a)(10).2 96 The spirit of the law comports with the lit-
eral wording. The definition affords the latitude which the drafters
and supporters of the statute intended to create.
To hold that the exemption excludes any note with a maturity
not in excess of nine months, as was asserted by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, would render the qualifying phrase impotent and stifle
the leeway which was built into the statute. The definitions under
the Securities Exchange Act specifically state that the definitions
are not set in stone.297 If the context requires otherwise, the courts
are free to examine the transaction in light of the definition. The
nomenclature is not the determining factor when viewed in light of
the Securities Acts.
298
To hold that the demand nature, in and of itself, removes the
instrument from the ambit of the Securities Acts would also be
violative of the spirit and letter of the law.2 99 The demand nature
does not serve to mitigate or eviscerate the risk which is inherent
in the Co-op's venture. The demand nature does not overcome the
investment nature of the transaction, the presence of a common
offering, or the public perception that the instrument constitutes a
security.
The current trend, as evidenced by Reves, has given effect to the
words of the statute while remaining true to the purpose of the
legislation. With the retirement of Justice Brennan however, the
direction which the Court will follow in the future is uncertain.
The remaining members of the Court are evenly split on the issue
of the interpretation of the Securities Exchange Act. Justice Sou-
ter is likely to be a driving force in the development of the defini-
tion of a security and the exclusion under the 1934 Securities Ex-
change Act, because he will likely act as the deciding vote in the
next securities issue.
Christine Ita McGonigle
296. See note 27 and accompanying text.
297. See section 3(a)(10) at note 27.
298. See note 37 and accompanying text.
299. See lanni, 100 Bank L J 100, 103 (cited in note 30).
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